Signalling Controls - Revision history

Swindonpanel at 11:42, 24 February 2024

2024-02-24T11:42:52Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:42, 24 February 2024
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	\| '''Highland Loop Controls'''		\| '''Highland Loop Controls'''
	\| Lighting of signals in loops only when a route is set towards them or a train is approaching them.		\| Lighting of signals in loops only when a route is set towards them or a train is approaching them.
	\| ~~Prevelant~~ in Scottish Region.		\| Prevalent in Scottish Region.
	\|-		\|-
	\| '''Huddersfield Controls'''		\| '''Huddersfield Controls'''

Danny at 22:46, 5 October 2015

2015-10-05T22:46:29Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:46, 5 October 2015
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	\| '''Tollerton Controls'''		\| '''Tollerton Controls'''
	\| Providing overlapping train detection sections at the boundary between detection systems (eg, track circuits to axle counters) or interlocking types (eg, RRI to SSI), where the section to be occupied to slower to react than the section to be vacated. Can also be achieved with a time delay.		\| Providing overlapping train detection sections at the boundary between detection systems (eg, track circuits to axle counters) or interlocking types (eg, RRI to SSI), where the section to be occupied is slower to react than the section to be vacated. Can also be achieved with a time delay.
	\| First identified at Tollerton. A little-known fact that York IECC has a relay interlocking in the Tollerton area which controls the auto sections there. (Better called a relay room as there is no interlocking of points and signals!) It was relatively new when the IECC was commissioned (formerly supervised by Tollerton box) and BR saw no reason to replace it with SSI. So it is a little island of relay-controlled signalling in a sea of SSI and hence the problems when trains transit across the boundary. The issue was no more than drivers receiving irregular step up / back down signal sequences when following another train, I don’t think anything actually happened.		\| First identified at Tollerton. A little-known fact that York IECC has a relay interlocking in the Tollerton area which controls the auto sections there. (Better called a relay room as there is no interlocking of points and signals!) It was relatively new when the IECC was commissioned (formerly supervised by Tollerton box) and BR saw no reason to replace it with SSI. So it is a little island of relay-controlled signalling in a sea of SSI and hence the problems when trains transit across the boundary. The issue was no more than drivers receiving irregular step up / back down signal sequences when following another train, I don’t think anything actually happened.
	\|-		\|-

Danny at 22:45, 5 October 2015

2015-10-05T22:45:09Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:45, 5 October 2015
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	\|-		\|-
	\| '''Morton-on-Lugg Controls'''		\| '''Morton-on-Lugg Controls'''
	\| Controls to retrospectively fit approach locking controls to level crossing barriers following the replacement of the protecting signal without the passage of a train. This has been necessary where the control is lacking following the 'like-for-like' replacement of manual gates (which had inbuilt 'natural' approach locking my their manual nature) with lifting barriers (which do not). (This control is sometimes also called 'Barrier Raise Inhibit Controls'.) The control has been tricky for the industry to fit, as it is largely required in mechanical areas, often with no track circuiting.		\| Controls to retrospectively fit approach locking controls to level crossing barriers following the replacement of the protecting signal without the passage of a train. This has been necessary where the control is lacking following the 'like-for-like' replacement of manual gates (which had inbuilt 'natural' approach locking by virtue of their manual nature) with lifting barriers (which do not). (This control is sometimes also called 'Barrier Raise Inhibit Controls'.) The control has been tricky for the industry to fit, as it is largely required in mechanical areas, often with no track circuiting.
	\| On 16th January 2010 an accident occurred at Moreton-on-Lugg level crossing that would have been prevented if approach locking had been fitted between the signal and level crossing controls.<ref>http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/reports_2011/report042011.cfm</ref>		\| On 16th January 2010 an accident occurred at Moreton-on-Lugg level crossing that would have been prevented if approach locking had been fitted between the signal and level crossing controls.<ref>http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/reports_2011/report042011.cfm</ref>
	\|-		\|-

Danny at 22:44, 5 October 2015

2015-10-05T22:44:27Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:44, 5 October 2015
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	\| '''Morton-on-Lugg Controls'''		\| '''Morton-on-Lugg Controls'''
	\| Controls to retrospectively fit ~~approaching~~ locking controls to level crossing barriers following the replacement of the protecting signal without the passage of a train. This has been necessary where the control is lacking following the 'like-for-like' replacement of manual gates (which had inbuilt 'natural' approach locking my their manual nature) with lifting barriers (which do not). (This control is sometimes also called 'Barrier Raise Inhibit Controls'.) The control has been tricky for the industry to fit, as it is largely required in mechanical areas, often with no track circuiting.		\| Controls to retrospectively fit approach locking controls to level crossing barriers following the replacement of the protecting signal without the passage of a train. This has been necessary where the control is lacking following the 'like-for-like' replacement of manual gates (which had inbuilt 'natural' approach locking my their manual nature) with lifting barriers (which do not). (This control is sometimes also called 'Barrier Raise Inhibit Controls'.) The control has been tricky for the industry to fit, as it is largely required in mechanical areas, often with no track circuiting.
	\| On 16th January 2010 an accident occurred at Moreton-on-Lugg level crossing that would have been prevented if approach locking had been fitted between the signal and level crossing controls.<ref>http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/reports_2011/report042011.cfm</ref>		\| On 16th January 2010 an accident occurred at Moreton-on-Lugg level crossing that would have been prevented if approach locking had been fitted between the signal and level crossing controls.<ref>http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/reports_2011/report042011.cfm</ref>
	\|-		\|-

Danny at 22:35, 5 October 2015

2015-10-05T22:35:15Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:35, 5 October 2015
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	\| '''Wiltshire Distant'''		\| '''Wiltshire Distant'''
	\| A 3 – 4 aspect transitional aspect sequence which utilises an isolated Y/YY/G signal to give full ~~breaking~~ distances for all signals. This ensures that no single signal has both a Y and YY as a first caution for the subsequent signal.		\| A 3 – 4 aspect transitional aspect sequence which utilises an isolated Y/YY/G signal to give full braking distances for all signals. This ensures that no single signal has both a Y and YY as a first caution for the subsequent signal.
	\| Named after Philip Wiltshire.		\| Named after Philip Wiltshire.
	\|}		\|}

Danny: Updates from NR

2014-09-22T10:29:48Z

Updates from NR

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:29, 22 September 2014
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	\| A control in signalling that requires points in the flank to be set and locked, but only detected at time of clearance. This prevents a detection failure of flank points from putting back an already signalled route on the main.		\| A control in signalling that requires points in the flank to be set and locked, but only detected at time of clearance. This prevents a detection failure of flank points from putting back an already signalled route on the main.
	Can also refer, at a converging junction, to the protecting signal requiring not only track circuits clear in its own route but also one or more of those between the protecting signal and the junction of the converging routes, such that a SPAD at one of the other converging signals will immediately protect the junction. This is a form of over run control.		Can also refer, at a converging junction, to the protecting signal requiring not only track circuits clear in its own route but also one or more of those between the protecting signal and the junction of the converging routes, such that a SPAD at one of the other converging signals will immediately protect the junction. This is a form of over run control.
			\| ?
			\|-
			\| '''Brownes Lock'''
			\|A lock that ensures that a sprung catch point is closed before a signal in rear of the catch point can be cleared up to a signal in advance of that catch, if the advance signal is at danger. This is only provided when the distance between the catch point and the signal in advance is less then the longest train that could be stopped at that signal.
			This lock ensures there is no risk of derailment for a train standing over these catch points. The signal in advance will require the catch points to be normal before it is allowed to be cleared (thus ensuring the catch points are effective).
			This control is very unlikely to be installed new, but is included for completeness.
	\| ?		\| ?
	\|-		\|-
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	\| '''Colwich Controls'''		\| '''Colwich Controls'''
	\| Preventing the display of flashing yellow junction indications ~~when~~ the signal immediately beyond the junction signal is ~~at danger~~. This is in case the driver fails to recognise that the junction signal is maintained at yellow and does not step up to a less restrictive colour.		\| Preventing the display of flashing yellow junction indications unless the signal immediately beyond the junction signal is clear or ready to clear. This is in case the driver fails to recognise that the junction signal is maintained at yellow and does not step up to a less restrictive colour.
	\| The driver of 86429 "The Times" on the 17.00 Euston-Manchester on 19 September 1986 mis-interpreted the flashing yellow junction sequence leading up to CH.28 as meaning the route was set throughout the whole junction complex (which it didn't and it wasn't) and passed the next signal CH.23 at danger, crashing into 86211 "City of Milton Keynes" on the 17.20 Liverpool-Euston which was legitimately signalled over the junction. 1 railwayman was killed and 75 passengers injured. <ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/DoT_Colwich1988.pdf</ref>		\| The driver of 86429 "The Times" on the 17.00 Euston-Manchester on 19 September 1986 mis-interpreted the flashing yellow junction sequence leading up to CH.28 as meaning the route was set throughout the whole junction complex (which it didn't and it wasn't) and passed the next signal CH.23 at danger, crashing into 86211 "City of Milton Keynes" on the 17.20 Liverpool-Euston which was legitimately signalled over the junction. 1 railwayman was killed and 75 passengers injured. <ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/DoT_Colwich1988.pdf</ref>
	\|-		\|-
	\| '''Foxhall Controls'''		\| '''Foxhall Controls'''
	\| Providing a position light junction indicator for the single route from a signal, where that single route applies through a set of facing points for the diverging route and track exists on the straight ahead route for which there is no legitimate signalled route. The provision of a junction indicator avoids the possibility of the driver believing they are heading 'straight on'.		\| Providing a position light junction indicator for the single route from a signal, where that single route applies through a set of facing points for the diverging route and track exists on the straight ahead route for which there is no legitimate signalled route (or it is of lower significance to the 'main' route). The provision of a junction indicator avoids the possibility of the driver believing they are heading 'straight on'.
	\| Warship D853 "Thruster" overturned on Foxhall Junction on 27 September 1967 wrecking the 9.45 Padd-Weston after mis-interpreting the green aspect with no junction indication in R.180 (and preceded by greens) as applying to the straight ahead route, when in fact it applied to a diverging route. R.180 not being fitted with a JI due to only having one main aspect route, that being the diverging route, with only draw-ahead aspects on the physically straight-ahead route. One passenger was killed and 23 injured. <ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=421</ref>		\| Warship D853 "Thruster" overturned at 75mph on Foxhall Junction (25mph PSR) on 27 September 1967 wrecking the 9.45 Padd-Weston after mis-interpreting the green aspect with no junction indication in R.180 (and preceded by greens) as applying to the straight ahead route, when in fact it applied to a diverging route. R.180 not being fitted with a JI due to only having one main aspect route, that being the diverging route, with only draw-ahead aspects on the physically straight-ahead route. One passenger was killed and 23 injured. <ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=421</ref>
			\|-
			\| '''Highland Loop Controls'''
			\| Lighting of signals in loops only when a route is set towards them or a train is approaching them.
			\| Prevelant in Scottish Region.
	\|-		\|-
	\| '''Huddersfield Controls'''		\| '''Huddersfield Controls'''
	\| Preventing a train being signalled permissively into a platform when the platform starting signal is already off (and conversely, preventing the platform starting signal clearing if another train is signalled in permissively behind). Designed to stop the driver entering the platform permissively from reading-through to the platform starting signal.		\| Preventing a train being signalled permissively into a platform when the platform starting signal is already off (and conversely, preventing the platform starting signal clearing if another train is signalled in permissively behind). Designed to stop the driver entering the platform permissively from reading-through to the platform starting signal.
	\| Not named after a particular incident at Huddersfield, but that was the first place to be fitted at resignalling in 1958. Widespread implementation after an accident at Stafford when, at 00.30 on 4 August 1990, the 23.36 Stoke-o-T to Birmingham Soho entered the platform with a calling-on aspect, while ahead, in the platform, the 22.18 Manchester Picc - Penzance had a green signal to depart. The Birmingham train collided with the rear of the Penzance killing the driver and injuring 36.<ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/HSE_Stafford1990.pdf</ref>		\| Not named after a particular incident at Huddersfield, but that was the first place to be fitted at resignalling in 1958. Widespread implementation after an accident at Stafford when, at 00.30 on 4 August 1990, the 23.36 Stoke-o-T to Birmingham Soho entered the platform with a calling-on aspect, while ahead, in the platform, the 22.18 Manchester Picc - Penzance had a green signal to depart. The Birmingham train collided with the rear of the Penzance killing the driver and injuring 36.<ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/HSE_Stafford1990.pdf</ref>
			\|-
			\| '''Insell Locking'''
			\| A means of holding a Signal in advance of a diverging junction signal at red where there is a risk of misreading or reading through.
			\| -
	\|-		\|-
	\| '''Lime Street Controls'''		\| '''Lime Street Controls'''
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	\| Controls to retrospectively fit approaching locking controls to level crossing barriers following the replacement of the protecting signal without the passage of a train. This has been necessary where the control is lacking following the 'like-for-like' replacement of manual gates (which had inbuilt 'natural' approach locking my their manual nature) with lifting barriers (which do not). (This control is sometimes also called 'Barrier Raise Inhibit Controls'.) The control has been tricky for the industry to fit, as it is largely required in mechanical areas, often with no track circuiting.		\| Controls to retrospectively fit approaching locking controls to level crossing barriers following the replacement of the protecting signal without the passage of a train. This has been necessary where the control is lacking following the 'like-for-like' replacement of manual gates (which had inbuilt 'natural' approach locking my their manual nature) with lifting barriers (which do not). (This control is sometimes also called 'Barrier Raise Inhibit Controls'.) The control has been tricky for the industry to fit, as it is largely required in mechanical areas, often with no track circuiting.
	\| On 16th January 2010 an accident occurred at Moreton-on-Lugg level crossing that would have been prevented if approach locking had been fitted between the signal and level crossing controls.<ref>http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/reports_2011/report042011.cfm</ref>		\| On 16th January 2010 an accident occurred at Moreton-on-Lugg level crossing that would have been prevented if approach locking had been fitted between the signal and level crossing controls.<ref>http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/reports_2011/report042011.cfm</ref>
			\|-
			\|'''Old Kent Road Controls'''
			\| ?
			\| ?
	\|-		\|-
	\| '''Raynes Park Controls'''		\| '''Raynes Park Controls'''
	\| Ensuring that the contacts that allow an approach-released signal to clear are not so separate from the contacts that control the signal in rear to danger that a failure scenario could allow the approach-release to be satisfied and the junction signal clear while the previous signal showed green.		\| Ensuring that the contacts that allow an approach-released signal to clear are not so separate from the contacts that control the signal in rear to danger that a failure scenario could allow the approach-release to be satisfied and the junction signal clear while the previous signal showed green. So ensuring that the approach-release is not effective for the signal in rear to clear.
	\| ?		\| ?
			\|-
			\|'''Rockcliffe Hall Control'''
			\|?
			\|?
	\|-		\|-
	\| '''Stowmarket Controls'''		\| '''Stowmarket Controls'''
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	\| The preventing of sending of a second 'line clear' on an absolute block instrument until the berth track circuit of the home signal has become occupied and clear after the first 'line clear' OR a mechanical release release 'winder' has been operated. This avoids the possibility of a signalman giving a line clear in the belief a train has left the section when it hasn't and giving a second line clear.		\| The preventing of sending of a second 'line clear' on an absolute block instrument until the berth track circuit of the home signal has become occupied and clear after the first 'line clear' OR a mechanical release release 'winder' has been operated. This avoids the possibility of a signalman giving a line clear in the belief a train has left the section when it hasn't and giving a second line clear.
	\| On 17th June 1935 the signalman at Welwyn Garden City erroneously gave 'train out of section' for train 825A 10.53pm Kings Cross - Newcastle) to Hatfield No 3 when it had not arrived, and accepted train 826 (10.58pm Kings Cross - Leeds). Even though the signalman at Hatfield No 3 rang the signalman at Welwyn Garden City to enquire as to the suspiciously short time train on 825A had spent in the section, the signalman at Welwyn Garden City was adamant. As a result of the lack of locking preventing the block being cleared before a train arrives, an the signalman at WGC's inattention, train no 826 crashed violently into the back of train 825A, killing 13 and seriously injuring 29.<ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/BoT_Welwyn1935.pdf</ref>		\| On 17th June 1935 the signalman at Welwyn Garden City erroneously gave 'train out of section' for train 825A 10.53pm Kings Cross - Newcastle) to Hatfield No 3 when it had not arrived, and accepted train 826 (10.58pm Kings Cross - Leeds). Even though the signalman at Hatfield No 3 rang the signalman at Welwyn Garden City to enquire as to the suspiciously short time train on 825A had spent in the section, the signalman at Welwyn Garden City was adamant. As a result of the lack of locking preventing the block being cleared before a train arrives, an the signalman at WGC's inattention, train no 826 crashed violently into the back of train 825A, killing 13 and seriously injuring 29.<ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/BoT_Welwyn1935.pdf</ref>
			\|-
			\| '''Wiltshire Distant'''
			\| A 3 – 4 aspect transitional aspect sequence which utilises an isolated Y/YY/G signal to give full breaking distances for all signals. This ensures that no single signal has both a Y and YY as a first caution for the subsequent signal.
			\| Named after Philip Wiltshire.
	\|}		\|}

Danny: Balham Controls updated

2014-09-22T10:13:22Z

Balham Controls updated

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:13, 22 September 2014
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	\|'''Angerstein Release'''		\|'''Angerstein Release'''
	\| A very short pulse of voltage sent back the wrong way along the Locking Level to permit clearing of an outer backshunt signal. Aka the "squirt".		\| A very short pulse of voltage sent back the wrong way along the Locking Level of a GEC Geographical Interlocking to permit clearing of an outer backshunt signal. Aka the "squirt".
	\| ?		\| ?
	\|-		\|-
	\| '''Balham Controls'''		\| '''Balham Controls'''
	\| ?		\| A control in signalling that requires points in the flank to be set and locked, but only detected at time of clearance. This prevents a detection failure of flank points from putting back an already signalled route on the main.
	~~\| ?~~		Can also refer, at a converging junction, to the protecting signal requiring not only track circuits clear in its own route but also one or more of those between the protecting signal and the junction of the converging routes, such that a SPAD at one of the other converging signals will immediately protect the junction. This is a form of over run control.
	\|-
	~~\| '''?'''~~
	~~\| At~~ a converging junction, ~~each~~ protecting signal ~~requires the~~ track circuits clear in its own route ~~and~~ also those between the protecting signal and the junction of the converging routes, such that a SPAD at one of the other converging signals will immediately protect the junction. ~~(Balham?)~~
	\| ?		\| ?
	\|-		\|-
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	\| Providing a position light junction indicator for the single route from a signal, where that single route applies through a set of facing points for the diverging route and track exists on the straight ahead route for which there is no legitimate signalled route. The provision of a junction indicator avoids the possibility of the driver believing they are heading 'straight on'.		\| Providing a position light junction indicator for the single route from a signal, where that single route applies through a set of facing points for the diverging route and track exists on the straight ahead route for which there is no legitimate signalled route. The provision of a junction indicator avoids the possibility of the driver believing they are heading 'straight on'.
	\| Warship D853 "Thruster" overturned on Foxhall Junction on 27 September 1967 wrecking the 9.45 Padd-Weston after mis-interpreting the green aspect with no junction indication in R.180 (and preceded by greens) as applying to the straight ahead route, when in fact it applied to a diverging route. R.180 not being fitted with a JI due to only having one main aspect route, that being the diverging route, with only draw-ahead aspects on the physically straight-ahead route. One passenger was killed and 23 injured. <ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=421</ref>		\| Warship D853 "Thruster" overturned on Foxhall Junction on 27 September 1967 wrecking the 9.45 Padd-Weston after mis-interpreting the green aspect with no junction indication in R.180 (and preceded by greens) as applying to the straight ahead route, when in fact it applied to a diverging route. R.180 not being fitted with a JI due to only having one main aspect route, that being the diverging route, with only draw-ahead aspects on the physically straight-ahead route. One passenger was killed and 23 injured. <ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=421</ref>
	\|-
	~~\| '''Gardeners Controls'''~~
	\| Where the barriers at an MCB or CCTV crossing live normally closed to road traffic, and road users indicate their wish to cross (normally with a push-button). The operator then raises the barriers when the interlocking permits, and closes them again when the road traffic has passed.
	\| A fatality at Gardners Crossing on the 'Tilbury Loop' between Stanford-Le-Hope and Pitsea, on 21 September 1994, which at the time was a user-worked crossing, where the person who was fatally injured had opened the first gate, drove his car on to the crossing, then got out to open the second gate, and returned to his car, at which point he was hit by a train. <ref>http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/man-dies-as-train-hits-car-at-unmanned-site-1450285.html</ref> <ref>http://forum.signalbox.org/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=6673&p=67480#p67458</ref>
	\|-		\|-
	\| '''Huddersfield Controls'''		\| '''Huddersfield Controls'''

Danny: Tollerton updated (AO)

2014-09-22T10:04:49Z

Tollerton updated (AO)

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:04, 22 September 2014
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	\| '''Tollerton Controls'''		\| '''Tollerton Controls'''
	\| Providing overlapping train detection sections at the boundary between detection systems (eg, track circuits to axle counters) or interlocking types (eg, RRI to SSI), where the section to be occupied to slower to react than the section to be vacated. Can also be achieved with a time delay.		\| Providing overlapping train detection sections at the boundary between detection systems (eg, track circuits to axle counters) or interlocking types (eg, RRI to SSI), where the section to be occupied to slower to react than the section to be vacated. Can also be achieved with a time delay.
	\| ~~An incident of~~ a ~~train being lost~~ in ~~1991~~....~~(?)~~		\| First identified at Tollerton. A little-known fact that York IECC has a relay interlocking in the Tollerton area which controls the auto sections there. (Better called a relay room as there is no interlocking of points and signals!) It was relatively new when the IECC was commissioned (formerly supervised by Tollerton box) and BR saw no reason to replace it with SSI. So it is a little island of relay-controlled signalling in a sea of SSI and hence the problems when trains transit across the boundary. The issue was no more than drivers receiving irregular step up / back down signal sequences when following another train, I don’t think anything actually happened.
	\|-		\|-
	\| '''Welwyn Controls'''		\| '''Welwyn Controls'''

Danny: Foxhall loco name added

2014-09-07T12:52:15Z

Foxhall loco name added

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:52, 7 September 2014
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	\| '''Foxhall Controls'''		\| '''Foxhall Controls'''
	\| Providing a position light junction indicator for the single route from a signal, where that single route applies through a set of facing points for the diverging route and track exists on the straight ahead route for which there is no legitimate signalled route. The provision of a junction indicator avoids the possibility of the driver believing they are heading 'straight on'.		\| Providing a position light junction indicator for the single route from a signal, where that single route applies through a set of facing points for the diverging route and track exists on the straight ahead route for which there is no legitimate signalled route. The provision of a junction indicator avoids the possibility of the driver believing they are heading 'straight on'.
	\| D853 "~~Warship~~" overturned on Foxhall Junction on 27 September 1967 wrecking the 9.45 Padd-Weston after mis-interpreting the green aspect with no junction indication in R.180 (and preceded by greens) as applying to the straight ahead route, when in fact it applied to a diverging route. R.180 not being fitted with a JI due to only having one main aspect route, that being the diverging route, with only draw-ahead aspects on the physically straight-ahead route. One passenger was killed and 23 injured. <ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=421</ref>		\| Warship D853 "Thruster" overturned on Foxhall Junction on 27 September 1967 wrecking the 9.45 Padd-Weston after mis-interpreting the green aspect with no junction indication in R.180 (and preceded by greens) as applying to the straight ahead route, when in fact it applied to a diverging route. R.180 not being fitted with a JI due to only having one main aspect route, that being the diverging route, with only draw-ahead aspects on the physically straight-ahead route. One passenger was killed and 23 injured. <ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=421</ref>
	\|-		\|-
	\| '''Gardeners Controls'''		\| '''Gardeners Controls'''

Danny: Corrections to trains in Colwich controls

2014-08-30T12:47:03Z

Corrections to trains in Colwich controls

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:47, 30 August 2014
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	\| '''Colwich Controls'''		\| '''Colwich Controls'''
	\| Preventing the display of flashing yellow junction indications when the signal immediately beyond the junction signal is at danger. This is in case the driver fails to recognise that the junction signal is maintained at yellow and does not step up to a less restrictive colour.		\| Preventing the display of flashing yellow junction indications when the signal immediately beyond the junction signal is at danger. This is in case the driver fails to recognise that the junction signal is maintained at yellow and does not step up to a less restrictive colour.
	\| The driver of 86429 "The Times" on the 17.~~20 Liverpool~~-~~Euston~~ on 19 September 1986 mis-interpreted the flashing yellow junction sequence leading up to CH.28 as meaning the route was set throughout the whole junction complex (which it didn't and it wasn't) and passed the next signal CH.23 at danger, crashing into 86211 "City of Milton Keynes" on the 17.00 Euston~~-Manchester~~ which was legitimately signalled over the junction. 1 railwayman was killed and 75 passengers injured. <ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/DoT_Colwich1988.pdf</ref>		\| The driver of 86429 "The Times" on the 17.00 Euston-Manchester on 19 September 1986 mis-interpreted the flashing yellow junction sequence leading up to CH.28 as meaning the route was set throughout the whole junction complex (which it didn't and it wasn't) and passed the next signal CH.23 at danger, crashing into 86211 "City of Milton Keynes" on the 17.20 Liverpool-Euston which was legitimately signalled over the junction. 1 railwayman was killed and 75 passengers injured. <ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/DoT_Colwich1988.pdf</ref>
	\|-		\|-
	\| '''Foxhall Controls'''		\| '''Foxhall Controls'''
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	\| D853 "Warship" overturned on Foxhall Junction on 27 September 1967 wrecking the 9.45 Padd-Weston after mis-interpreting the green aspect with no junction indication in R.180 (and preceded by greens) as applying to the straight ahead route, when in fact it applied to a diverging route. R.180 not being fitted with a JI due to only having one main aspect route, that being the diverging route, with only draw-ahead aspects on the physically straight-ahead route. One passenger was killed and 23 injured. <ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=421</ref>		\| D853 "Warship" overturned on Foxhall Junction on 27 September 1967 wrecking the 9.45 Padd-Weston after mis-interpreting the green aspect with no junction indication in R.180 (and preceded by greens) as applying to the straight ahead route, when in fact it applied to a diverging route. R.180 not being fitted with a JI due to only having one main aspect route, that being the diverging route, with only draw-ahead aspects on the physically straight-ahead route. One passenger was killed and 23 injured. <ref>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=421</ref>
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	\| '''~~Gardners~~ Controls'''		\| '''Gardeners Controls'''
	\| Where the barriers at an MCB or CCTV crossing live normally closed to road traffic, and road users indicate their wish to cross (normally with a push-button). The operator then raises the barriers when the interlocking permits, and closes them again when the road traffic has passed.		\| Where the barriers at an MCB or CCTV crossing live normally closed to road traffic, and road users indicate their wish to cross (normally with a push-button). The operator then raises the barriers when the interlocking permits, and closes them again when the road traffic has passed.
	\| A fatality at Gardners Crossing ~~[where?]~~, ~~in 1995-ish~~, which at the time was a user-worked crossing, where the person who was fatally injured had opened the first gate, drove his car on to the crossing, then got out to open the second gate, and returned to his car, at which point he was hit by a train.		\| A fatality at Gardners Crossing on the 'Tilbury Loop' between Stanford-Le-Hope and Pitsea, on 21 September 1994, which at the time was a user-worked crossing, where the person who was fatally injured had opened the first gate, drove his car on to the crossing, then got out to open the second gate, and returned to his car, at which point he was hit by a train. <ref>http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/man-dies-as-train-hits-car-at-unmanned-site-1450285.html</ref> <ref>http://forum.signalbox.org/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=6673&p=67480#p67458</ref>
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	\| '''Huddersfield Controls'''		\| '''Huddersfield Controls'''